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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON REDISTRIBUTION
THROUGH CLASS POWER

Mark Barenberg*

My comments will not be so much a critique as an elaboration of the two
papers, especially Professor Neuman's paper on United States (U.S.) law,' since
I am not an expert on German constitutional law. For those less familiar with
U.S. law, my goal is to bring to light some additional elements of the U.S.
constitutional tradition that impede the use of law to achieve economic
equality-elements of U.S. constitutional law that reinforce the weak "general
equality" principle of the Equal Protection Clause. 2 I will use U.S. labor law as
my vehicle for showing the variety of constitutional principles that sustain actual
economic inequality in the United States.
I start with two important points made in Neuman's paper. The first point is
that the U.S. law of general equality does not use the language of social class
when it discusses economic inequality but instead speaks of poverty, income and
welfare entitlements. The second point is that the New Deal constitutional
revolution of the 1930's only ended the constitutional prohibition of
redistributive legislation; it did not affirmatively mandate a redistributive social
state.
I want to distinguish three ways in which the social state may try to
implement redistributive policies: first, by taxation and transfer payments, or
taxation and spending; second, by direct regulation of the outcomes of social
interaction; and third, by changing the background entitlements and endowments
of social groups in order to change their relative bargaining power in the group
struggle to divide social wealth and social goods more generally. The first two
modes of redistribution occur through representative politics and through
technocratic implementation. The third mode implements redistribution through
direct participation in a restructured social setting. The leading example is legal
reform that restructures the social setting of labor markets by replacing
individual employment contracts with collective bargaining. The law gives
employees new rights of association and new rights to collectively withdraw
their labor (or strike) and thereby participate in the redistributive process of
which they themselves are the beneficiaries.
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the generosity of
the Robert Bosch Stiftung in funding the symposium at which this Article was presented.
I See Gerald Neuman, Equal Protection, "General Equality," and Economic Discrimination from
a U.S. Perspective, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 281 (1999).
2 Id. at 294 (explaining the weakness of the general equality principle in US constitutional law);
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1.
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The social institution of the labor market was at the center of the two great
moments of change in the constitutional principles of general equality. First, the
Civil War amendments-the amendments that give us the Equal Protection
principle-marked the replacement of slavery with sharecropping and wage
labor. Up to the 1930's, these labor market institutions were constitutionally
protected by the Lochner doctrine, which prohibited legislative interference with
individual employment contracts.3 (It is significant that many of the landmark
cases of the Lochner era arose from the politically burning "labor question," in
response to which courts struck down laws to protect trade union activity or to
mandate labor standards.) 4 Second, the New Deal ended this constitutional
mandate of laissez-faire in the labor market and permitted but, as Neuman
emphasizes, did not require legislative encouragement of collective bargaining
for purposes of participatory redistribution among social classes.5
The federal legislature did in fact exploit its new constitutional authority and,
in the 1930's, enacted legislation to prohibit companies from firing workers for
organizing unions or strikes and legislation that established minimum wages and
unemployment benefits. 6 (In the 1960's and afterward, Congress passed
legislation prohibiting private employers from discriminating against employees
based on race, gender, national origin, religion, age, and physical disability.
Professor Kendall Thomas's contribution to this symposium discusses this law.7 I
will only note that before the 1930's, this antidiscrimination legislation, just like
the collective bargaining law, would have been an unconstitutional interference
with the employer's liberty of contract.)
What I would like to point out is that the legislative effort at "class-based
general equalitization"--or participatory redistribution through collective
bargaining-still faced constitutional obstacles even after the 1930's. Some of
these obstacles to economic equalization (or "class-based general equality")
were rooted in the Supreme Court's weak interpretation of the Equal Protection
principle. Some came from other constitutional doctrines.
I have time to discuss three or four of these constitutional obstacles, although
several others could be catalogued.
First, the weak interpretation of Equal Protection itself has multiple
consequences that indirectly limit the redistribution of bargaining power from
capital to labor through collective bargaining. Labor's bargaining power is
weakened in a society that affords a low "social wage"-that is, low welfare
benefits, low unemployment benefits, low minimum wage, low health-care
3 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4 See, e.g., id.(striking down maximum hours law); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525

(1923) (striking down minimum wage law); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a
law protecting unionization); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (same).
5 See Neuman, supra note 1 at 284.
6 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. (imposing minimum wages and
overtime pay); National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (protecting union
organizing and collective bargaining).
' See Kendall Thomas, The Political Economy of Recognition: Affirmative Action Discourse and
Constitutional Equality in Germany and the U.S.A., 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 329 (1999).
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entitlements, low provision for worker-retraining, and so on. If workers face
destitution when they are out of work, they have less determination to organize
unions, to hold out during strikes, and to demand and achieve higher wages. The
weak principle of general equality in the United States-in contrast to equality
principles that affirmatively mandate social provision across multiple social
contexts-entails a cumulatively diminished social wage and therefore
cumulatively diminished bargaining power for labor.
In addition, the United States Supreme Court, applying the same weak
principle of general equality, has ruled that the legislature does not violate Equal
Protection if it denies specifically to strikers even the cumulatively diminished
social wage that the state provides to workers who are impoverished or
unemployed for reasons other than the exercise of their associational right to
collective bargaining.' In other words, the weak principle of general equality in
U.S. constitutional law allows the state explicitly to discriminate against strikers
and union members in state programs that provide social benefits.
A second constitutional obstacle to class-based redistribution comes from U.S.
principles of Federalism. The fifty states of the United States have great
authority to provide different social wages, and the states have used that
authority in fact to provide widely different levels of welfare payments,
unemployment compensation, minimum wages, and so on. The states also have
authority to prohibit collective bargaining agreements that require workers to pay
dues to the majority-elected union. These are the so-called "right to
work"states. 9 The fifty states and their local subdivisions also compete among
each other to attract capital investment by offering tax incentives and subsidies
to mobile businesses and by lowering the social wage and the business taxes
that finance the social wage. 10
Here is where constitutional law comes in. The Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution explicitly grants Congress authority to regulate interstate
commerce." The Supreme Court has found that this clause implicitly prohibits
the state governments from excessively regulating interstate commerce. 12 This
doctrine is called the "Negative Commerce Clause." This constitutional doctrine
is an obstacle to class-based redistribution because it prohibits states that want to
follow a strategy of maintaining high private wages, high social wages and high
labor-standards from taking action against goods from states that follow a
deliberate strategy of suppressing labor standards. In the period after World War
II, capital investment fled from high-wage, unionized states of the Northeast and
Midwest to the low-wage, non-union states of the South and Southwest. The
negative commerce clause disempowered the high-wage states from taking the
various kinds of unilateral or coordinated action that the U.S. federal
government, through its trade law, takes against foreign low-wage countries that
I Lyng v. United Automobile Workers, 108 S.Ct. 1184 (1988).
9 See Grodin & Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 95
(1964).
10See, e.g., Robert Crandall, Manufacturing on the Move (1993).
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
1 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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suppress labor standards. The flight of capital from unionized to non-unionized
states has severely weakened the effectiveness of class-based redistribution in the
United States since the 1930's.
The third constitutional obstacle to class-based redistribution comes from the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of free speech. Under
U.S. labor law, workers who wish to form a union must win a majority-rule
election in their work unit. 13 In the 1930's, the National Labor Relations Board
prohibited companies from participating in the campaigns leading up to these
elections among the workers, on the plausible grounds that employer campaigns
intimidated employees and that the relevant voting community was the
employees not the employer. 4 But the Supreme Court reversed the Labor Board
and ruled that employers had a constitutional right to communicate aggressive,
daily propaganda about the evils of unions, including predictions of mass layoffs
and plant closings, to the employees whose livelihoods depended on the
employer. 15

Since that time, the Supreme Court has ruled that union supporters have no
constitutional right to communicate their message in shopping centers, parking
lots, or other property that is used by employers for such captive audience
propaganda campaigns.1 6 In such cases, the Supreme Court has found no state
action-the necessary predicate for constitutional protection of free speecheven though the police powers of the state are manifestly deployed in the state's
enforcement of property law and in the background establishment of corporate
and trade union entities.
The Supreme Court has also ruled that picketing for purposes other than labor
protest is constitutionally protected speech activity, but picketing that conveys a
message about labor disputes is not. 17 Federal and state legislatures may
therefore suppress labor picketing even though they may not suppress similarly
effective picketing about other social issues. When the Supreme Court allows
such unequal treatment, it ignores the central principle of free-speech
jurisprudence-that the state must not discriminate among speech activites on
the basis of the content of the speech. The impact on redistribution is significant
because legislatures are thereby permitted to prohibit picketing in support of
secondary or sympathy strikes. This entails a dramatic weakening of labor's
bargaining power, especially because U.S. labor law creates highly fragmented
and decentralized units of collective bargaining.
Labor lawyers in the United States-including those who represent unions as
well as those who represent companies-uniformly agree that these First
Amendment and State Action doctrines severely distort the communication and
13 Linden Lumber v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
'4 See A. Cox, et al., Labor Law 144 (12th ed. 1996).

11 NLRB v. Virginia Electric, 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
16 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
17 See NAACP v. Claibourne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (state regulation of non-labor
picketing subject to strict constitutional scrutiny afforded protected speech); Teamsters v. Vogt, 354
U.S. 284 (1957) (state regulation of labor picketing not subject to constitutional scrutiny afforded
protected speech).
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democratic deliberation among employees participating in a union election, and
give an overwhelming advantage to anti-union employers. 8
To summarize my basic point: The Supreme Court's approach to Equal
Protection and Due Process changed in the 1930's in a way that formally
permitted federal and state legislatures to restructure markets in order to
redistribute power among social classes, in the service of a particularized
conception of general economic equality. This mode of legislative redistribution
required new rights of association and communication among workers, precisely
because it was a participatory mode of redistribution among social groups. But
since the 1930's, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of general equality, social
provision, federalism, free speech, and state action has limited the capacities and
incentives for association and communication among workers. To that extent,
U.S. Constitutional law continues to weigh against participatory redistribution.
The resulting erosion of wage-setting institutions in the United States helps
explain (to that extent) one of the salient differences between United States and
German societies in the last quarter-century, and the astonishing increase in
general economic inequality in the United States.

s See, e.g., Martin Levitt, Confessions of a Union Buster (1993).

